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BOOK REVIEWS

A CALL FOR RESTRAINT
Posen, Barry R. Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ.
Press, 2014. 234pp. $29.95

Sometimes, less is more. “More” may
seem the order of the day in U.S. security
policy, between ISIS, Ukraine, and other
issues, but MIT political scientist Barry
Posen offers a powerful cry for “less!”
His book Restraint: A New Foundation
for U.S. Grand Strategy calls for doing
less, promising less, and spending less
than the United States does today. The
book is not a plea for isolationism or
disarmament, but it makes a convincing
case that America’s current strategy of
“liberal hegemony” is both wasteful and
counterproductive, creating more problems than it solves. Posen’s strategy is not
entirely novel—it is a form of offshore
balancing—but Restraint is a worthy
contribution. The book offers the most
thorough and theoretically grounded
rationale for offshore balancing to date,
as well as practical diplomatic and
defense planning recommendations, in a
concise and well-organized monograph.

Gulf, but eschewing liberal interventionism or pursuit of global primacy. Why
should America now pull back? First,
Posen argues, the relative economic and
military strength of the United States has
eroded; supplying security while allies
take a free ride is not affordable. U.S.
soft power has also been diminished by
the excesses of liberal hegemony. The
Iraq war, the Kosovo war (the geopolitical consequences of which Americans
underestimate), NATO expansion, “color
revolutions,” and the like convinced China, Russia, and even democracies like
Brazil that America is not a status quo
power, and many nations now affirmatively challenge U.S. activism. Third, nationalism remains a potent force—contra
the predictions of liberals—meaning
that an anti–United States stance is
good politics in many countries, and
that U.S. meddling in other regions
motivates nonstate extremist groups.

Posen has not always been in the restraint camp. A long-standing scholar
of grand strategy, in the 1990s Posen
favored “selective engagement”—maintaining U.S. alliances and forward presence in Europe, Asia, and the Persian

Posen recommends two basic changes
in U.S. military intervention and
military posture. He believes the
United States should avoid intervention
by force in other nations’ politics—
whether preemptive regime change or
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“humanitarian” operations in the middle
of civil wars. The more fundamental
change he advocates is for the United
States to withdraw gradually from security guarantees and permanent forward
basing of American forces. Pulling back
would incentivize allies—NATO, Japan
and South Korea, Israel, Saudi Arabia,
etc.—to provide more of their own
security. Posen recognizes and accepts
that some allies might go nuclear in
response, but he sees such proliferation as less risky than U.S. entanglement, particularly since some allies
treat U.S. support as a blank check for
reckless behavior. In Posen’s world, the
United States would rely on local power
balancing to prevent the rise of regional
hegemons in Eurasia, on nuclear deterrence as an ultimate backstop for the
United States, and on “command of the
commons” both to prevent power projection by others against U.S. interests
and to facilitate American involvement
in Eurasia if that becomes necessary.
Perhaps the most compelling case
against this minimalist approach comes
from fellow realists like Robert Art, who
would agree with the critique of liberal
hegemony but argue that the costs of
U.S. alliances and forward basing are
better than the risks inherent in letting
local powers sort out power relationships on their own. The United States
might be safe from attack, but regional
wars could damage the global economy,
bringing painful recessions to American
citizens. Posen does address that argument, responding essentially that there is
a great deal of ruin in a global economy
(apologies to Adam Smith). True, there
is much alarmism on the subject, particularly around oil shocks, but one still
wonders about applying past examples
of neutral countries doing fine during
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major wars to today’s tightly coupled
supply chains and financial markets.
Posen also offers force structure implications. Many grand strategy proposals
leap directly from foreign policy ideas to
laundry lists of weapons to purchase or
cancel. To his credit, Posen conducts the
intermediate linking step of identifying
military missions and broad operating
concepts (the guidance provided—in
theory—by a National Military Strategy). The core recommendation is to
design a force for securing “command
of the commons,” i.e., sea, air, and space.
This is an idea Posen has advocated for
some time, but is fully appropriate to
offshore balancing. The Navy fares very
well in his recommended force structure,
e.g., keeping nine carriers, while the
Army and Marines take the bulk of cuts.
Overall Posen thinks spending 2.5 percent of GDP on defense would suffice, a
25 percent cut from today’s base budget.
While it is suited to his strategy, some
might criticize Posen’s proposed force
as too conventional in its details—i.e.,
emphasizing aircraft carriers in the
face of growing threats like the Chinese
DF-21 missile. There is room for more
attention to such emerging challenges.
That said, Posen’s strategy would have
little requirement for close-in U.S.
strikes against the Chinese or Russian
homeland versus being able to thwart
an adversary’s attempts to project
power across open oceans at us.
For those familiar with the grand strategy literature, the broad case in Restraint
is in line with those of other offshore
balancers, like John Mearsheimer, Steve
Walt, and Christopher Layne. What
Posen adds is a comprehensive theorygrounded analysis of the problems
of liberal hegemony and merits of an
offshore approach, backed by forty-five
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pages of endnotes. Uniquely, the book
also develops practical recommendations for implementing the strategy
with serious attention to timelines and
regional nuances. Where Layne’s Peace
of Illusions traces historical failings of
the hegemonic approach, Restraint is
a timely, fleshed-out policy proposal.
Ultimately, many policy makers will never get past page 1, where Posen defines
American national security interests as
the traditional sovereignty, safety, territory, and international power position.
Threats to those are modest and Posen
makes a compelling case they are best
managed through limited overseas commitments. On the other hand, many in
Washington believe American hegemony
—euphemized as “leadership”—is in
and of itself a fundamental interest, and
that no economic and physical risks are
acceptable. That one televised beheading
five thousand miles away can so alarm
America suggests this will not change
soon. For those willing to think critically about America’s security needs,
however, Restraint offers a deeply logical
challenge and a thoughtful blueprint.
DAVID T. BURBACH

Stavridis, James G. The Accidental Admiral: A
Sailor Takes Command at NATO. Annapolis, Md.:
Naval Institute Press, 2014. 288pp. $32.95

In the early days of the Second World
War, General Eisenhower, the first
Supreme Allied Commander of Europe,
struggled to keep the alliance together.
One of the more interesting anecdotes
about this struggle is when he almost
fired a member of his staff because the
officer was, shall we say, culturally insensitive. The story goes that an American
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officer, a colonel on Eisenhower’s staff,
insulted a British officer by calling him
a British bastard. Ike wasn’t pleased.
Ike threatened to bust him down to
private. Being a bastard, he said, was not
a national characteristic. All were equal
in the eyes of the allies. But admittedly,
handling NATO has not gotten any
easier over the years. Secretary Gates,
prior to his departure, had some choice
words for the alliance, urging more
NATO members to meet the required 2
percent of their GDP on defense spending. America, he noted, continues to
pick up the slack—from Afghanistan
to Libya. Yet the alliance remains.
Admiral James Stavridis, USN (Ret.),
most recently Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and
commander of U.S. European Command (EUCOM), and unofficially, the
Navy’s advocate of the well-known
John Adams quotation—“Let us
tenderly and kindly cherish, therefore
the means of knowledge. Let us dare
to read, think, speak and write”—has
written an enjoyable memoir of his
time in Eisenhower’s old chair.
Stavridis’s memoir stays away from criticism of U.S. officials and discussions of
contentious closed-door meetings. This
is in contrast to two other high-profile,
former administration officials’ memoirs
—those of Ambassador Christopher Hill
and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta
—which were published around the
same time to much hoopla. While
Stavridis was dual hatted as SACEUR
and EUCOM his reputation around the
headquarters was one of civility and
intelligence, certainly not a bad combination. Stavridis says he wants to show
the reader not what happened during his
four years, but rather why it happened.
He proceeds to take the reader on a tour
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